

WARRANT TYPE: ARREST WARRANT
AWPS#: 17000256
COURT CASE NUMBER:

CASE TYPE: FELONY
REFILE INDICATOR:
DIVISION:

TO ALL AND SINGULAR SHERIFFS OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA, GREETINGS:
YOU ARE HEREBY COMMANDED TO IMMEDIATELY ARREST THE DEFENDANT AND BRING HIM OR
HER BEFORE ME, A JUDGE IN THE 11TH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT OF FLORIDA, TO BE DEALT
WITH ACCORDING TO LAW:

DEFENDANT'S NAME: SARBINOFF
LAST

GRANT
FIRST

GRIFFITH
MIDDLE

TTL

AKA(S):
STR/APT/CITY/ST/ZIP: 4150 NAUTILUS DR / / MIAMI BEACH / FL/ 331402820
DOB: 09/01/1979 RACE: W SEX: M HEIGHT: 509 WEIGHT: HAIR: BRO EYES: BRO
SOC SEC #: [REDACTED] CIN #: SID #: FBI #:
SCARS, MARKS, TATTOOS: IDS #: 3136178
DRIVERS LICENSE #: [REDACTED] STATE: FL MAKE: MODEL: YEAR: COLOR:
VEH TAG #: STATE: MAKE: MODEL: YEAR: COLOR:
COMMENTS:

PROBATION:

BEFORE ME PERSONALLY CAME KAUFMAN, STEVEN (AFFIANT) WHO, BEING DULY
SWORN, STATES THAT THE DEFENDANT ** SARBINOFF, GRANT GRIFFITH **, DID COMMIT THE
ACTS STATED IN THE ATTACHED STATEMENT OF FACTS. BASED UPON THIS SWORN STATEMENT
OF FACTS, I FIND PROBABLE CAUSE THAT ** SARBINOFF, GRANT GRIFFITH ** DID COMMIT
THE CRIME(S) OF:

- M 1 784.048(2) STALKING 1,000
- M 2 365.16(1)(A) PHONE CALL/OBSCENE/HARASSING 500
- M 2 934.425(5) INSTALL TRACKING DEVICES/TRACKING APPLICATIONS 500
- F 3 934.215 COMMUNICATIONS DEVICE/UNLAWFUL USE 23,000

SEE NEXT PAGE FOR ADDITIONAL CHARGES

IN DADE COUNTY, FLORIDA, CONTRARY TO FLORIDA STATUTES AND AGAINST THE PEACE AND
DIGNITY OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA.

POLICE CASE #: PD170313097364 AGENCY: MIAMI DADE POLICE
ASSISTANT STATE ATTORNEY: HEDRICK, STEWART

UNIT: 079

EXTRADITE INFORMATION

EXTRADITION CODE: 1 - FELONY - FULL EXTRADITION UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED IN MIS FIEL
EXTRADITION MAY BE CONFIRMED WITH THE METRO-DADE POLICE DEPARTMENT, DADE COUNTY
** IN ANY EVENT, DEFENDANT WILL BE ARRESTED IF FOUND IN THE STATE OF FLORIDA **

SWORN TO BY AFFIANT KAUFMAN, STEVEN COURT ID 030-099 4403
SO ORDERED THIS 1 DAY OF May, 2017

[Signature]
C. R. [Signature]

\$500,000.00
BOND AMOUNT

JUDGE IN THE 11TH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT IN AND FOR DADE COUNTY FLA

- () FIRST APPEARANCE JUDGE MAY NOT MODIFY CONDITION OF RELEASE
- () TO ANSWER UNTO THE STATE OF FLORIDA ON AN INFORMATION OR INDICTMENT
FILED AGAINST HIM OR HER BY THE STATE ATTORNEY FOR THE CHARGE(S) OF:
- () UPON ORDER OF A JUDGE IN THE ELEVENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT OF FLORIDA FOR
FAILURE TO APPEAR IN COURT TO ANSWER THE PENDING CHARGE(S) FOR THE
CHARGE(S) OF:

HARVEY RUVIN, CLERK OF THE COURT

BY _____
DEPUTY CLERK

DATE

WARRANT TYPE: ARREST WARRANT
AWPS#: 17000256
COURT CASE NUMBER:
DEFENDANT'S NAME: SARBINOFF

CASE TYPE: FELONY
REFILE INDICATOR:
DIVISION:
GRANT

GRIFFITH

- F 3 815.06 (2) (A) COMPUTER USERS/OFFENSES AGAINST
- F 3 815.06 (2) (A) COMPUTER USERS/OFFENSES AGAINST
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- F 3 815.06 (2) (A) COMPUTER USERS/OFFENSES AGAINST

25,000 each
cost
07

AWPS#: 17000256
COURT CASE NUMBER:
DEFENDANT'S NAME: SARBINOFF

PAGE: 3
REFILE INDICATOR:
DIVISION:
GRANT GRIFFITH

F 1 817.568(2)(C) IDENTIFICATION/INFO/USE FRAUDULENTLY 50,000
F 3 817.568(2)(A) IDENTIFICATION/PERSONAL/FRAUDULENTLY USE/POSSESS

25,000 *by*

Your Affiant is Detective Steve Kaufman of the Miami Dade Police Department. Your Affiant has been employed as a police officer for the past twenty (20) years and is currently assigned to the Miami-Dade Police Department's Homeland Security Bureau, Cyber Crimes Unit. Your Affiant has been a police officer for twenty (20) years and is currently assigned to the Homeland Security Bureau's Cyber Crime Unit and is currently a Task Force Officer with the United States Secret Service's Miami Electronic Crimes Task Force. Your Affiant has received continuous training in Cyber, Internet and Social Media investigations from the Miami-Dade Public Safety Training Institute, Miami-Dade County, Florida and Cellebrite Cyber and Social Media related investigations, Orange County, Florida. Your affiant has also received training from various telecommunication and internet provider companies to include Apple, AT&T, Metro PCS, T-Mobile, Verizon, Google Inc. Microsoft Corporation, Comcast and several other companies.

Your Affiant has participated in numerous cyber related investigations, including approximately over 100 that involved the tracking of blocked and spoofed phone calls and internet protocol addresses. Your Affiant has also participated in numerous investigations that involved the tracking of blocked and spoofed phone calls that were specifically utilized in bomb threat and swatting calls over the past eight (8) years. Your Affiant has interviewed numerous persons arrested for cyber related offences and has viewed various forms of cyber related crimes. Your Affiant has experience conducting criminal investigations including preparations of subpoenas, utilizing information received from confidential informants, identification of individuals utilizing technologies and computer applications utilized by persons to commit illegal acts. Your Affiant's training and experience has made him familiar with the manner in which computers and cyber methods and applications are utilized for illegal purposes.

This Affidavit is based upon information known personally to your affiant and information obtained from others who have investigated this matter and/or have personal knowledge of the facts herein. Your Affiant has participated in this investigation, spoken with other law enforcement detectives, and has reviewed documents and police reports related to this investigation. Your Affiant has set forth only those facts necessary to establish probable cause in support of this application, and thus, not every detail known to your Affiant and other law enforcement officers concerning this investigation is stated herein.

ASA's Initials SK


Page 1 of 31
32 A

Affiant's Initials SK
Judge's Initials SK



As part of a joint investigation between the Miami-Dade State Attorney's Office Cyber Crimes Unit and the Miami-Dade Police Department Homeland Security Bureau's Cyber Crime Unit, your Affiant has been assigned MDPD case number PD170313097364. The case involves Stalking, Identity Theft, Unauthorized Use of Computers, Unlawful Installation of a Tracking Device, Unlawful Interception of Wire, Oral or Electronic Communications and Unlawful Use of a Communications Device. Victim K.L. is being stalked and cyberstalked by her ex-boyfriend Mr. Grant Griffith Sarbinoff, the "Subject," who is also accessing many computer services belonging to K.L. without her permission and impersonating her. In several calls to K.L. from the Subject, he impersonated friends and colleagues of hers by using their telephone numbers without permission. In addition, Victim K.L.'s current boyfriend, Victim P.T., has been receiving numerous harassing phone calls and text messages and has had numerous attempts made to access various online accounts belonging to him without his permission.

On or around November 14, 2015, K.L., an attorney, started dating the Subject, also an attorney, after they met on an online dating application called Tinder. The relationship lasted until approximately September 28, 2016, when the relationship was abruptly ended by the Subject while they both chatted on G-Talk, which is an online messenger application by Google. The Subject continued to contact K.L. immediately following the break up. The Subject communicated with K.L. in some form nearly every day from September 29, 2016 until the present day. The communications contained numerous personal insults directed toward K.L., friends and colleagues of hers, and her family. K.L. received hundreds of phone calls from the Subject where he used an application called Spoofcard to spoof the Caller ID display on K.L.'s phone and make it appear as if one of friends or contacts was calling her. Caller ID spoofing is the practice of causing the telephone network to indicate to the receiver of a call that the originator of the call is a station other than the true originating station. K.L. also received dozens of voicemails from the Subject. The communication is still currently ongoing. Also, shortly after the breakup, K.L. began noticing that her email accounts, social media accounts, and other internet accounts were being manipulated, accessed, attempted to be accessed and/or deleted.

Some specific instances that identify the accounts and services the Subject was using and accessing and that reflect the nature of the communications are detailed in the following paragraphs. Because of the great volume of the Subject's communications, not every instance is itemized.

ASA's Initials 

Page 2 of 31
32/10

Affiant's Initials 
Judge's Initials 

On September 29, 2016 the Subject contacted K.L. using the Caller ID spoofing service SpoofCard to conceal his telephone number (305-890-6804) and make it appear that he was messaging from XXX-XXX-6504. A search of the Florida Bar's website shows his listed number as 305-890-6804. From your Affiant's experience and knowledge from dealing with over a hundred instances of spoofing techniques your affiant believed that the calls originated from a popular spoofing service called Spoofcard which is owned by Teltech. Upon your affiant contacting Spoofcard they confirmed that their services were being utilized to make the spoofed calls to K.L.'s past and present phone numbers. A subpoena was sent to Spoofcard and their records confirmed that the account was established with the verified phone number of 305-890-6804 (which belongs to the Subject) and a registered email address of gsarbino1@gmail.com. The records showed the spoofed phone calls made by the Subject to multiple phone numbers belonging to K.L. The records also showed that phone calls using spoofed Caller ID information were made by the Subject to several of K.L.'s acquaintances and to Victim P.T. Finally the records indicated that the Subject recorded as many as four of the phone calls using the Spoofcard service.

Teltech (Spoofcard) was also able to provide the credit card number which was utilized to make numerous payments on the account [REDACTED]. Your Affiant determined that this card was serviced by Bank of America. Bank of America records show that the card is a debit card for an account registered in the Subject's name and belonging to the Subject. They corroborated the charges reflected on the Spoofcard account used to contact the victim.


During a message exchange, K.L. expressly stated for the Subject to stop contacting her and that she would save future correspondence for use in obtaining an injunction. Later on September 29, 2016 the Subject contacted K.L. using his trendlinens@icloud.com account and his literock@me.com account. The trendlines@icloud.com account correspondence is as follows:


If you had asked me to stop contacting you, then I will.

Is that what you want?

You didn't have to call the cops on me.

The literock@me.com email was sent to the victim's email. The email asked "Did you have a nervous breakdown?"

ASA's Initials 

Page 3 of 34 

Affiant's Initials 
Judge's Initials 

On September 30, 2016 the Subject contacted K.L. using his gсарbino@gmail.com account where he again asked K.L. “Did you have a nervous breakdown? It is very sad that you and your friend [redacted], spread so much hate – especially racist hate – given the current events in our world” On the same date he contacted her from his gсарbinogsарbino@gmail.com account. The Subject then requested K.L. share her location with him using the Apple Find My Friends service associated with his literock@mac.com account. Next he commented on K.L.’s Pandora Music Service profile using his “gsарbino” Pandora account.

On October 1, 2016, the Subject contacted K.L. using his trendlines@icloud.com account. The correspondence is as follows:

Now you can go be a bigot and gossip without anyone knowing or judging you

On October 1, 2016, at 12:18 pm, the Subject sent the victim an email from gсарbinogsарbino@gmail.com. The email is as follows:

Great article. If it was on [Redacted], then it would be about black people who choose to put black people in prison and keep white people out.

The email closes with a hyperlink to a legal blog article.

On October 1, 2016, at 4:17 pm, the Subject sent K.L. a message from a spoofed telephone number ending in 4219 where he told K.L. that he had reported a family member of hers for a crime and told him that K.L. was responsible for the report.

On October 1, 2016, at 6:26 pm, the Subject sent the victim an email from gсарbinogsарbino@gmail.com. The email is as follows:

I bet you forwarded my email to your Uncle Tom friend.

On October 2, 2016, the Subject contacted K.L. using the trendlinens@icloud.com account. The correspondence is as follows:

How are [Redacted] and [Redacted]?

Or did you go to [Redacted] instead?

I don’t really care just making a point.

I hope you haven’t been crying too much.

Hello?

On October 3, 2016, at 11:47 am, the Subject sent the victim an email from gсарbinogsarbino@gmail.com. The email is as follows:

[Redacted]

Are you going to forward that other email, too?

Seriously, if you had wanted me to not contact you, then why didn't you tell me that instead of screaming that you'll call the cops when I come to drop off your key – since you wouldn't respond when I asked you what you wanted me to do with it.

Grant

K.L. replied to the Subject “I have blocked you. You keep contacting me through other means. Also, I told you to leave me alone last week, but I'll say it one more time: stop contacting me.” at his gсарbinogsarbino@gamil.com email account. This was the last communication from K.L. to the subject.

During all of the following conversations, the victim does not respond or engage with the Subject. On October 3, 2016, at 2:42 pm, the Subject sent the victim an email from gсарbinogsarbino@gmail.com. The email is as follows:

You would think that you'd block me if you didn't want to hear from me.

On October 3, 2016, at 7:14 pm, the Subject sent the victim an email from gсарbinogsarbino@gmail.com. The email is as follows:

How many times are you going to open my emails?

On October 3, 2016, at 7:24 pm, the Subject sent the victim an email from gсарbinogsarbino@gmail.com. The email is as follows:

You're not as nice as you think you are. Because [Redacted] you project that anger on me even though I never did anything to deserve it. All I ever did was assert myself and not stand for it.

On October 3, 2016, at 7:54 pm, the Subject sent the victim an email from gсарbinogsarbino@gmail.com. The email is as follows:

Finally blocked me?

On October 3, 2016 9:54 pm, the Subject sent the victim an email from gсарbinogsarbino@gmail.com. The email is as follows:

ASA's Initials SAH

Page 5 of 31

Affiant's Initials SL
Judge's Initials JM

Selective in the emails you forward, I see. It just proves my point that you're a gossip and a spinster. Or was it "sparkster?"

Regardless, how long do you think you can maintain this façade? Like many have said to me, there's probably a reason why you're 32 and never had a boyfriend – that reason is that you're probably just not a good person with your phony altruism. You're just like [Redacted] – a limosine Liberal, a "basic."

On October 4, 2016, the Subject contacted K.L. using the trendlinens@icloud.com account. The correspondence stated "So weird."

On October 5, 2016, the Subject attempted to gain access to K.L.'s Hulu.com account requesting a password change, all without her permission. K.L. was made aware of this by an email from Hulu.com advising her of the password change. Hulu.com is a protected computer system that secures its users accounts with a password system. Your Affiant confirmed that the attempt to change K.L.'s password was made from the Subject's then residential address of 4150 Nautilus Dr. in Miami Beach, FL. Hulu.com recorded the Subject's IP address of 72.28.210.60, which is serviced by Atlantic Broadband. Your Affiant obtained records from Atlantic Broadband that reflect that address as the service address. A review of the Subject's registered addresses with DMHSV show that address as his residential address during that time period. Upon your Affiant's workup of the Subject, your Affiant learned the Subject listed this address on his voter registration, FPL bill and Experian and Transunion Databases.


On October 6, 2016, at 1:48 am, the Subject sent the victim an email from gsarbinogsarbino@gmail.com. The email is as follows:


Judge [Redacted] is right on a couple of things: [Redacted]'s self-righteousness and solipsism.

On October 6, 2016, at 8:37 am, the Subject sent the victim an email from gsarbino@gmail.com. The email is as follows:

Got excited that [Redacted] wanted to chat?

On October 6, 2016, at 8:40 am, the Subject sent the victim an email from literock@icloud.com. The email is as follows:

ASA's Initials 

Page 6 of 31 

Affiant's Initials 
Judge's Initials 

The reason I asked [Redacted] if you were a real Christian is because I've never known a Christian to lob so much hate like you and your friends do.

On October 6, 2016, at 8:44 am, the Subject sent the victim an email from gсарbinogsarbino@gmail.com. The email is as follows:

Maybe you should try cleaning your house while you sit in it all day alone? Or are you going to pop some lorazepam and sleep all day?

On October 6, 2016, at 10:59 am, the Subject sent the victim an email from gсарbinogsarbino@gmail.com. The email is as follows:

This is you. Do you need help? I'm not sure why you go around with Schedule IV drugs without a prescription in your purse.

The email closes with a copy/pasted description of the signs and symptoms of Ativan use.

On October 6, 2016, at 11:27 am, the Subject sent the victim an email from gсарbinogsarbino@gmail.com. The email is as follows:

<http://americanaddictioncenters.org/ativan-treatment/long-term/>
Navigating to the link brings up a website titled "The Dangers of Long-Term Use of Ativan"

On October 6, 2016, at 11:58 am, the Subject sent the victim an email from gсарbinogsarbino@gmail.com. The email is as follows:

If there was no truth to anything I'm saying, then you would've blocked my email address a long time ago.

On October 6, 2016, at 12:04 am, the Subject sent the victim an email from gсарbinogsarbino@gmail.com. The email is as follows:

It's funny because I went through similar stuff with my friend Rob. My old roommate and I were the only ones who were around Rob enough to spot anything wrong. If you think you can hide things from me, then you are nothing compared to Rob. He was the master of hiding things, but I eventually figured it out.

On October 6, 2016, at 12:30 am, the Subject sent the victim an email from gсарbinogsarbino@gmail.com. The email is as follows:

Oh, and don't worry, I already took screenshots of [Redacted]'s defamatory FB posts about me. You should tell her to look up defamation per se. I've got her

ASA's Initials SAH

Page 7 of 31
3:22

Affiant's Initials SAH
Judge's Initials SAH

good on this one. You criminal defense attorneys seem to forget how civil law works.

On October 6, 2016, at 12:45 am, the Subject sent the victim an email from gсарbinogsarbino@gmail.com. The email is as follows:

I just spoke with Judge [Redacted]. [Redacted] might want to be careful with her words. They will eventually catch up with her. She's not right.

On October 6, 2016, at 2:31 pm, the Subject sent the victim an email from gсарbinogsarbino@gmail.com. The email is as follows:

How are you going to defend [Redacted] out of this one? Judge [Redacted] and I both have rock-solid defamation cases against [Redacted]. Your friend is not nearly as smart as she thinks she is. At least she was smart enough to delete the entire post. This is what happens when you gossip. People stay in jail, and others lose their shirts.

The email closes with an attached image file "IMG_0503.PNG"

On October 6, 2016, at 7:26 pm, the Subject sent the victim an email from gсарbinogsarbino@gmail.com. The email is as follows:

I guess you didn't go to [Redacted]'s after all. I guess you would've had her answer the phone if you had gone there. Who was that before? [Redacted]? [Redacted]?

On October 6, 2016, at 8:29 pm, the Subject sent an email to two of the victim's email address. The email is as follows:

As far as I'm concerned these are your words. This is YOUR friend and yo lu (sic) out these words in her mouth. So, I have no problem "gossiping" about your cousin, [Redacted], in the morning. Nor do I have a problem "gossiping" to the Bismarck cops or the Saudi Aramco people – I've got to keep those just in case you try to retaliate again like you did with [Redacted]. But I'm just a dumb cracker.

You, [Redacted], [Redacted], [Redacted], and probably most of your other Miami friends are all huge hypocrites/bigots. All phony.

Its amazing how insecure you all are.

Did you know that her threat of filing a bar complaint against me is actually an ethics violation? I'll gladly provide you with the FL Bar opinions.

On October 6, 2016, at 10:03 pm, the Subject sent the victim an email from gсарbinogsarbino@gmail.com. The email is as follows:

Do you think I am bluffing about your cousin?

ASA's Initials SH

Page 8 of 31
32 H

Affiant's Initials SH
Judge's Initials WJ

On October 6, 2016, at 10:08 pm, the Subject sent the victim an email from gсарbino@gmail.com. The email is as follows:

You thought I was bluffing. You were the one who said I could do whatever I wanted since we were broken up.
Attached to the email is a forwarded email from the Sacramento Superior Court confirming the request of a transcript.

On October 7, 2016, at 12:17 pm, the Subject sent the victim an email from gсарbinogsарbino@gmail.com. The email is as follows:


Let me know if you need help finding a rehab program. The only way I'd be convinced that you're not on some sort of drug, prescription or otherwise, is by being randomly drug tested at a clinic for several weeks. Like I said before, if it's not drugs, then you should really consider going to a psychologist and/or psychiatrist. The girl in those videos singing and dancing on stage wasn't the girl I met and the statistics aren't in your favor given your family history, and current history, or (sic) drug abuse. Like I'm really going to believe that you're the only one in your family who isn't chemically dependent?

On October 7, 2016, at 8:51 pm the Subject contacted K.L. using his grantsарbinoff@gmail.com account. He makes an insulting statement about the victim's physical health. Records from the car service Uber.com show that the Subject was picked up from Miami Beach and dropped off on the same block as K.L.'s home at 9:44 p.m. and then picked up from there at 9:53 p.m. K.L.'s home is more than ten miles away from Miami Beach.


On October 7, 2016, literock@mac.com sent messages to the victim's phone. The messages include a link to a YouTube video entitled "Shyness or Narcissism? Avoidant Personality Disorder. The messages are as follows:

It's good that you get to go work on your day off now that you and I didn't do anything over the long weekend. I hope it helps with the jobs.
I hope you still plan on going to your friend's wedding in Austin. You shouldn't cancel that trip because of me.
Regardless, I hope you get help for whatever it is that struggling with. You should really consider taking it seriously, and not self-medicating.
People can only keep up the façade for so long before it become (sic) too difficult to keep up the act.

On October 8, 2016, at 9:20 am the Subject contacted K.L. using his grantsарbinoff@gmail.com account. The email is as follows:

ASA's Initials 

Page 9 of 31

Affiant's Initials 
Judge's Initials 

Are you going to sleep all weekend like always? [Redacted]

On October 8, 2016, at 9:20 am the Subject contacted K.L. using his grantsarbinoff@gmail.com account. The email is as follows:

I'm at a Method Man and Redman concert. They're black and saying the "n"-word! Should I leave because I'm a dumb 'ol cracker?!

On October 8, 2016, K.L.'s Publix.com account was accessed and she received a password reset request.

On October 9, 2016, at 12:39 am the Subject contacted K.L. using his grantsarbinoff@gmail.com account. The email is as follows:

I'm backstage with Thievery Corporation. I'm not supposed to be here, but I snuck back here (you and your friends would probably blame my luck on my "white, male privilege). There are black and brown people here. Do I have to leave, or is ok for dumb 'ol crackers like me to stay?

I'm being serious. I don't know how this stuff works, and you're the expert...you know...because you're so worldly and all.

Let me know.

The email also includes an attached image IMG_0528.JPG

On October 9, 2016, at 1:35 am the Subject contacted K.L. using his grantsarbinoff@gmail.com account. The email is as follows:

Maybe I'm wrong about the creative writing course. The only one I found at Books & Books at the Arscht Center was NOT confirmed. Maybe that's why you ended up buying books and never said anything about the actual creative writing course. [Redacted]

On October, 9, 2016, K.L.'s Etsy.com account was accessed and she received a password reset request. That same day, the subject attempted to access Kayak.com using K.L.'s email address, but failed because K.L. had never set up a Kayak.com account. On October 11, 2016 K.L.'s equinox.com account was accessed and her reservation for a bicycle was cancelled.

On October 12, 2016, the Subject emailed K.L. using gsarbinogarbino@gmail.com. The email is as follows:

So you think I hacked your email? I didn't.

On October 12, 2016, K.L.'s Instagram account was accessed and she received a password reset request.

On October 13, 2016, the Subject emailed the victim's work email account using lightrock@mac.com. The email is as follows:

[Redacted],

I let [Redacted] and the Paws4You people know about your Ativan addiction and abuse. There's no need for any more innocent creatures to be injured or die because of your chemical intoxication.

G

On October 13, 2016, K.L.'s Rover.com account was accessed and she received a password reset request. Also on that date, K.L. received notice that she had been signed up for three events using her Meetup.com account that she had not actually signed up for. Later that day, K.L.'s Checkout51 account was accessed by the subject without her permission. Checkout51 recorded the IP address 72.28.210.60 which was assigned to the Subject's residence. That same day, records from the car service Uber.com show that the Subject was picked up from Miami Beach and dropped off one block from K.L.'s home at 8:41 p.m. and then picked up from there at 9:01 p.m. Records from Verizon show that the Subject's cellular phone was connected to one of the cellular towers surrounding K.L.'s home while making a phone call at 8:57 p.m.


On October 14, 2016, K.L.'s Eventbrite.com was accessed, without her permission, and tickets were ordered. K.L.'s Opentable.com account was compromised and five dining reservations were made, and her Resy.com account was compromised and used to make one dining reservation, all without her permission. The Subject accessed K.L.'s Birchbox.com account without her permission and placed an order totaling \$15.00 and charged to K.L.'s credit card all without her permission. K.L.'s email address, name and phone number were utilized to sign her up for an appointment with Massage Envy without her permission. Later that date K.L.'s HBO.com account was accessed and she received a password reset request.



On October 15, 2016, K.L.'s Resy.com account was accessed again and another dining reservation was made without her permission.

On October 21, 2016, records from the car service Uber.com show that the Subject was picked up from his Miami Beach address and dropped off at K.L.'s home at 11:59 p.m. and picked up from there at 12:09 a.m. the next morning.

On October 23, 2016, at 6:09 pm, the Subject sent the victim an email from gsarbinogsarbino@gmail.com. The email is as follows:

ASA's Initials 

Page 11 of 31
32 

Affiant's Initials 
Judge's Initials 

I got hired. I ship off for 8 months of training on Monday. Thanks for all of your support.

I hope you got help for the Ativan/Lorazepam problem, [Redacted]. I wish you the best.

On October 26, 2016, the Subject purchased a Spy Tech STI_GL300 car GPS tracker and a Monster Magnetics waterproof case for mounting car GPS trackers from Amazon.com. They were delivered to his 4150 Nautilus Dr. address in Miami Beach. Spy Tech charges its users a monthly subscription fee for viewing the GPS location of these devices. Records obtained from Spy Tech show that the Subject signed up using his literock@me.com email address and his 4150 Nautilus Drive Miami Beach mailing address. He paid the subscription for the months of October, November, December, January and February using his personal Bank of America debit card associated with his personal checking account. Bank of America bank records corroborate these purchases. Later on October 26 at 4:27 pm, the Subject sent the victim an email from gсарbinogsarbino@gmail.com. The email is as follows:

Why did you get all of your hearings off calendar tomorrow? Looks like you've had a very light schedule lately. I hope

On October 26, 2016, at 5:02 pm, the Subject sent the victim an email from gсарbinogsarbino@gmail.com. The email is as follows:

You must not have gotten my email from last week where I told you that I got hired and shipped off to 8 months of training. So far, so good. I got here on Monday.

On October 26, 2016, at 6:22 pm, the Subject sent the victim an email from gсарbinogsarbino@gmail.com. The email is as follows:


It's interesting how you selectively forward things to [Redacted] or your other work friends.


On October 28, 2016, at 10:29 am, the Subject sent the victim an email from gсарbinogsarbino@gmail.com. The email is as follows:



I'm guessing that you didn't go to the wedding today. Hopefully it's because you're in rehab for your drug problem, and not because of anything else.

On October 28, 2016, at 10:42 pm, the Subject sent the victim an email from gсарbinogsarbino@gmail.com. The email is as follows:

So you did go. Good.

ASA's Initials 

Page 12 of 31
3:12 

Affiant's Initials 
Judge's Initials 

Later that day, records from the car service Uber.com show that the Subject was picked up from Miami Beach and dropped off one block from K.L.'s home where she keeps her car at 11:14 p.m. and then picked up from there at 11:22 p.m.

On November 5, 2016, records from the car service Uber.com show that the Subject was picked up from Miami Beach and dropped off about a block from K.L.'s home at 10:58 p.m. and then picked up from there at 11:09 p.m.

On November 7, 2016, at 1:45 am, the Subject sent the victim an email from gsarbinogsarbino@gmail.com. The email is as follows:

I know that you were really trying to eat healthier/go vegetarian, probably per your doctor's order, for your own health, not mine. Typical of you to hide something like that. [Redacted]

I'm guessing your Ativan abuse started as a way to manage your insomnia, and that you [Redacted] I even asked you if you had any medical issues at one point, and you said, "no." It really makes me think that just about everything you told me about yourself was completely false, and that's not even considering all of the convenient omissions of fact you made at just about every turn. But, you're just a "very private person" who shares these things with coworkers like [Redacted] though. As I very reluctantly said once before, you're just like my mom – except she's a better manipulator/spin doctor.

It doesn't seem like your lack of transparency is working out for you, but it also appears that my complete openness is bad with the likes of you.



I hope you're getting help for your drug abuse. Let me know if you need assistance in finding a good treatment facility. I'm sure [Redacted] can give recommendations to share with you.

On November 9, 2016, at 11:33 pm, the Subject sent the victim an email from gsarbinogsarbino@gmail.com. The email is as follows:

How come you aren't printing or forwarding my emails anymore?

On November 10, 2016, records from the car service Uber.com show that the Subject was picked up from his Miami Beach address and dropped off one block from K.L.'s home at 2:00 a.m. and then picked up from there at 2:20 a.m. That same day, K.L.'s Eventbrite.com account was accessed and she received a password reset request. The Subject also sent K.L. an email reflecting the arrest of a member of K.L.'s family and referencing a Facebook video. That evening, records from the car service Uber.com show that the Subject was again picked up from Miami Beach and dropped off on the same block as K.L.'s home at 9:21 p.m. and then picked up from there at 9:39 p.m.

ASA's Initials 

Affiant's Initials 
Judge's Initials 

On November 11, 2016, records from the car service Uber.com show that the Subject was picked up from Miami Beach and dropped off on the same block as K.L.'s home at 8:15 p.m. and then picked up from there at 9:31 p.m.

On November 13, 2016, records from the car service Uber.com show that the Subject was picked up from Miami Beach and dropped off at K.L.'s home at 9:07 p.m. and then picked up from there at 9:56 p.m. Records from Verizon show that the Subject's cellular phone was connected to one of the cellular towers surrounding K.L.'s home while making a phone call at 9:15 p.m.

On November 15, 2016, at 11:57 am, the Subject sent the victim an email from gсарbinogsarbino@gmail.com. The email has a subject line of "Article about you" and reads as follows:

<http://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/08/opinion/sunday/a-confession-about-liberal-intolerance.html>

On November 15, 2016, at 9:43 pm, the Subject sent the victim an email from gсарbinogsarbino@gmail.com. The email reads as follows:

This criminal law defense stuff is way easier than you make it sound. I got my client a nolle prosequi. I haven't seen you do that for any of yours.

On November 15, 2016, K.L.'s Runkeeper.com account was accessed and she received a password reset request. On November 23, 2016 the Subject contacted K.L. and threatened to publicize the family member's arrest.

On November 20, 2016, records from the car service Uber.com show that the Subject was picked up from Miami Beach and dropped off about a block from K.L.'s home at 12:33 a.m. and then picked up from there at 12:44 a.m. Records from Verizon show that the Subject's cellular phone was connected to one of the cellular towers surrounding K.L.'s home while making a phone call at 12:44 a.m.

On November 21, 2016, at 9:43 pm, the Subject sent the victim an email from gсарbinogsarbino@gmail.com. The email reads as follows:

Can you/[Redacted] stop sending your little goons to follow me, please? Don't you have better things to be doing? I heard you had a very large amount of cases that have yet to be resolved. Maybe you should focus on that instead? Maybe the Ativan is making it so that you can't give your clients proper representation. Get help.

On November 22, 2016, at 3:23 pm, the Subject sent the victim an email from gsarbino@gmail.com. The email reads as follows:

[Redacted]. At least then [Redacted] will be able to get “the good drugs” from you again.

On November 22, 2016, at 9:43 pm, the Subject sent the victim an email from gsarbino@gmail.com. The email contains a forwarded victim notification from Sacramento County. Later that day, records from the car service Uber.com show that the Subject was picked up from Miami Beach and dropped off about a block from K.L.’s home at 11:11 p.m. and then picked up from there at 11:48 p.m.

On November 23, 2016, records from the car service Uber.com show that the Subject was picked up from Miami Beach and dropped off about a block from K.L.’s home at 5:28 a.m. and then picked up from there at 6:11 a.m. Later that day at 5:52 pm, the Subject threatened K.L. with a message using the Facebook messaging service in the following message:

We can keep doing this if you want. In a few days, the search engines will start listing my FB pages and groups for your [Redacted]. It’s your call.
I know everything so don’t play dumb.

On November 25, 2016, trendlinens@icloud.com, sent messages to the victim’s phone. The messages states:



I hope it wasn’t a total waste of your time two nights ago. I’d appreciate it if you left me alone. Thanks.
Oh, and have your friends leave me alone, too. Thanks.

The Subject sent the victim a message later that day from the trendlinens@icloud.com account stating “Enjoy North Dakota”

On December 6, 2016, records from the car service Uber.com show that the Subject was picked up from Miami Beach and dropped off about a block from K.L.’s home at 11:53 p.m. and then picked up from there at 12:01 a.m. the next morning. Shortly after, the Subject was picked up from Miami Beach and again dropped off about a block from K.L.’s home this time at 1:29 a.m. and then picked up from there at 1:37 a.m.

On December 14, 2016, K.L.’s civicore.com, themisbar.com, and overstock.com accounts were accessed and she received password reset requests. Access to K.L.’s fsaid.ed.gov and USAJobs.com accounts were also attempted, which resulted in the accounts being locked.

ASA’s Initials 

Affiant's Initials 
Judge's Initials 

On December 15, 2016, K.L. parked her car near the residence of P.T. and met him for dinner. Records from the car service Uber.com show that the Subject was picked up from Miami Beach and dropped off on the same block as K.L.'s car at 9:22 p.m. and then picked up from the vicinity at 11:25 p.m. K.L. shortly thereafter received a message from the Subject inquiring about the date she had gone on that day and disparaging her about it. K.L. had not shared with the Subject that she was even going on the date in the first place. Records from Verizon show that the Subject's cellular phone was connected to one of the cellular towers surrounding K.L.'s car while making several phone calls from 11:18 p.m. to 11:24 p.m.

Between December 15, 2016 and December 16, 2016, alone K.L. received approximately 58 phone calls from the Subject. On December 16, 2016, K.L.'s Fandango.com account was accessed and she received a password reset request. K.L.'s CapitalOne.com account was also attempted to be accessed, which resulted in the account being locked. K.L.'s Google Services account was accessed using K.L.'s school email address without her permission.

On December 17, 2016, the Subject gained access into K.L.'s Facebook.com account and changed her password all without her permission.


On December 18, 2016, the Subject again accessed K.L.'s Facebook.com account and again changed the password on the account. Later, records from the car service Uber.com show that the Subject was picked up from Miami Beach and dropped off about a block from K.L.'s home at 11:00 p.m. and then picked up from there at 11:12 p.m.

On December 19, 2016, the Subject logged into K.L.'s Apple account without her permission using Apple's password recovery application. That same day, records from the car service Uber.com show that the Subject was picked up from Miami Beach and dropped off about a block from K.L.'s home at 7:55 p.m. and then picked up from there at 8:14 p.m.



On December 20, 2016, at 6:14 pm, the Subject sent the victim an email from gsarbinogsarbino@gmail.com. The email reads as follows:

Now you have [Redacted] following me? Seriously, get a life. Go to rehab. Spend some time on your clients' cases so they don't keep having to take plea agreements. Clean all of the dog piss and shit off your floors. Get treated for hoarding. Do something. There are way better uses of your time.

On December 23, 2016, records from the car service Uber.com show that the Subject was picked up from Miami Beach and dropped off about a block from K.L.'s home at 5:16 a.m. and

ASA's Initials 

Page 16 of 31
32

Affiant's Initials 
Judge's Initials 

then picked up from there at 5:24 a.m. Later at 11:37 am, the Subject sent the victim an email from gsarbino@gmail.com. The email reads as follows:

I guess you don't get a chance to defend these types because the cops kill them first.

<https://www.thesun.co.uk/news/2469333/berlin-terror-trucker-anis-amri-pictured-with-other-migrants-on-italian-island-of-lampedusa-in-2011-after-escaping-arab-spring-in-his-native-tunisia/>

Again that evening, records from the car service Uber.com show that the Subject was picked up from Miami Beach and dropped off about a block from K.L.'s home at 9:20 p.m. and then picked up from there at 9:59 p.m.


On December 24, 2016, the Subject again attempted to gain access to K.L.'s Hulu.com account and she received a password reset request. Later, records from the car service Uber.com show that the Subject was picked up from Miami Beach and dropped off about a block from K.L.'s home at 8:08 p.m. and then picked up from there at 8:20 p.m.

On December 25, 2016 K.L.'s myFPL.com account was accessed and she received a password reset request. Later, records from the car service Uber.com show that the Subject was picked up from Miami Beach and dropped off about a block from K.L.'s home at 7:39 p.m. and then picked up from there at 7:52 p.m.



On December 31, 2016, into the early morning of January 1, 2017 K.L. celebrated New Year's with P.T. at P.T.'s residence. K.T. parked her car nearby. Records from the car service Uber.com show that the Subject was picked up from Miami Beach and dropped off near K.L.'s car at 12:51 a.m. and then picked up from the vicinity at 1:25 a.m. Records from Verizon show that the Subject's cellular phone was connected to one of the cellular towers surrounding K.L.'s car while making several phone calls from 1:07 a.m. to 1:28 a.m. Later, on January 1, K.L.'s email address, name and address were utilized to order two pizzas from Papa Johns for \$28.68 cash on delivery without her permission. That evening, records from the car service Uber.com show that the Subject was picked up from Miami Beach and dropped a few block from K.L.'s home at 8:10 p.m. and then picked up from the same block as her home at 8:38 p.m.

On January 2, 2017, K.L. received notice that her CVS Caremark prescription had been cancelled.

On January 3, 2017, at 9:35 am, the Subject sent the victim an email from gsarbino@gmail.com. The email reads as follows:

ASA's Initials 

Page 17 of 31
323

Affiant's Initials 
Judge's Initials 

There's more to come, [Redacted]. Happy New Year. I hope you got treatment for your drug abuse problem. I saw that [Redacted] is going to prison for a long time. I hope you, [Redacted], [Redacted], and whomever else you ship and receive illegal drugs to/from all get help and avoid the same fate of [Redacted].

On January 3, 2017, at 11:10 am, the Subject sent the victim an email from gsarbino@gmail.com. The email reads as follows:

Tell [Redacted], or whomever you keep forwarding my emails to, that this "cracker" said howdy.

On January 5, 2017, at 2:17 am, the Subject sent the victim an email from gsarbino@gmail.com. The email reads as follows:

I stumbled on this article while working on a new assignment. I thought it might be of some benefit to you – particularly, the last two sentences (no pun intended). <http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/12/03/selective-empathy/>

Where do you draw the line with you selective empathy? How do you decide who deserves your empathy? In reality, you can't because you don't have the power to define morality, no matter how much you, and the rest of your pretentious goons, like to believe to the contrary.


Like my old calculus professor, Mr. [Redacted], always said, "Don't be sheep." Maybe you'll start winning some trials for your clients if you end your selective empathy – true empathy tends to lead to stronger logic/arguments.

I hope [Redacted]'s bond wasn't raised too high.

Later that day, K.L. parked her car at Sunset Place and went to see a film with a colleague. Records from the car service Uber.com show that the Subject was picked up from Miami Beach and dropped off about around Sunset Place at 9:32 p.m. K.L. drove home from the theatre close to that time. After arriving home, she went to take her dog for a walk and saw who appeared to be the Subject at the end of her block. Upon seeing her, the Subject cut through some trees to the next block over. Uber records show that the Subject was picked up a couple of blocks from there at 10:23 p.m. Records from Verizon show that the Subject's cellular phone was connected to one of the cellular towers surrounding K.L.'s home while making a phone call at 10:16 p.m.

On January 6, 2017, records from Verizon show that the Subject's cellular phone was connected to one of the cellular towers surrounding K.L.'s home while making several phone calls from 1:03 p.m. to 1:15 pm.

ASA's Initials




Page 18 of 31

32

Affiant's Initials



Judge's Initials



On January 7, 2017, records from Verizon show that the Subject's cellular phone was connected to one of the cellular towers surrounding K.L.'s home while making several phone calls at 12:06 a.m., 11:37 a.m., and 6:26 p.m.

On January 9, 2017, records from Verizon show that the Subject's cellular phone was connected to one of the cellular towers surrounding K.L.'s home while making a phone call at 9:08 p.m.

On January 10, 2017, the Subject's Bank of America records show that he rented a vehicle from Enterprise Rent-A-Car.

On January 11, 2017, records from Verizon show that the Subject's cellular phone was connected to one of the cellular towers surrounding K.L.'s home while making a phone call at 2:24 a.m.

On January 12, 2017, the Subject sent the victim a message to the victim's phone from his literock@icloud.com account. The message stated "Are you shopping for new judges?"

On January 15, 2017, records from Verizon show that the Subject's cellular phone was connected to one of the cellular towers surrounding K.L.'s home while making several phone calls at 4:56 a.m., from 9:34 a.m. to 9:36 a.m., and from 11:07 p.m. to 11:08 p.m.

On January 16, 2017, records from Verizon show that the Subject's cellular phone was connected to one of the cellular towers surrounding K.L.'s home while making several phone calls from 3:45 a.m. to 3:47 a.m.

On January 17, 2017, records from Verizon show that the Subject's cellular phone was connected to one of the cellular towers surrounding K.L.'s home while making several phone calls from 5:29 p.m. to 6:03 p.m.

Beginning On January 18, 2017, records from Verizon show that the Subject's cellular phone was connecting to cellular towers tracking his driving from Miami to Indianapolis, IN where the Subject is believed to have moved for the time being. Also on that date the Subject sent another message to the victim using the literock@icloud.com account. The message stated:

Your dad couldn't help you either?

[Redacted] and [Redacted] couldn't either?

[Redacted] and [Redacted]? [Redacted]? Nobody? Do you still need referrals to rehab facilities?

On January 19, 2017, the Subject sent a photograph to the victim. The Subject also sent messages stating:

Is monster sick?

You're probably trying to extract location metadata from the photo. Good luck.

On January 21, 2017, the subject messaged K.L. from the literock@icloud.com account asking "How was Chipotle?" K.L. had not shared with the Subject that she had eaten there.

On January 24, 2017 the Subject messaged the victim from the literock@icloud.com account. The messages stated "No more dates with [redacted], so no need to get waxed?" The subject later messaged her from the same account stating "One year probation? I hope the cops never go to the farm and find guns and drugs there."

On January 26, 2017, the Subject using the same account messaged the victim stating:

Sick Day?

Or are your parents back in town and [Redacted] is smoking hash on your front steps again?

Later that day, the subject messaged the victim from the same account stating "Did your [Redacted] get enough alcohol to replenish the stash?" On January 27, 2017, the Subject messaged the victim from the account asking "Getting your dress for the wedding tomorrow?"

On January 29, 2017, the Subject messaged the victim from the account asking "Going to get Monster now?" and later that day "Or maybe you're just watching a movie."

On January 30, 2017, the Subject, using the same account messaged the victim stating:

Are you picking up your [Redacted]'s hash?

Or dropping off your ugly wedding outfit because you got stains on it?

Later that day, the subject messaged the victim again stating:


Why did you wear a white pantsuit to a wedding?


Is that an HRC/Suffragette statement you decided to make at your friend's wedding, or just a poorly thought/unflattering fashion choice?



The Subject included a photograph with the message.

The Subject then messaged "Is that your [Redacted] and [Redacted] in the background?"

On February 5, 2017, the Subject sent the victim a link from the literock@icloud.com account of a dating website with a photo of the victim's boyfriend. Later that day he messaged

ASA's Initials 

Page 20 of 31
32


Affiant's Initials 
Judge's Initials 

her “Were you able to fake enough interest in sports today to make everyone ‘happy?’” On February 6, 2017 the Subject sent a message to the victim from the account stating “And I know all about that night you went for sushi with [Redacted]”

On February 10, 2017, at 7:25 am, the Subject sent the victim an email from gсарbino@gmail.com. The email contains disparaging references to K.L.’s salary and student loans. Also on February 10, 2017, the Subject accessed K.L.’s FPL.com account and terminated the electric service to her residence. FPL captured the IP address that the Subject used to access K.L.’s account as 24.106.96.82. This is the same IP address the Subject used to access his SpoofCard account and to make payments using his personal debit card.

On February 12, 2017, an attempt to manipulate a Goodreads.com account using K.L.’s school email address failed because K.L. had never set up a Goodreads.com account. The Subject again attempted to access her CapitalOne.com account resulting in a password reset code being sent to K.L., and a subsequent attempt resulted in the account being locked. On February 13, 2017 K.L.’s Delta SkyMiles account was attempted to be compromised and resulted in her log-in information being sent to her email account. K.L.’s Amazon.com, Papajohns.com, Paypal.com, and AirBNB.com accounts were also accessed and she received password reset requests for them. The Subject also accessed K.L.’s FPL account again without her permission.

On February 15, 2017, the Subject sent the victim some messages from the literock@icloud.com account. The messages are as follows:

Does [Redacted] know you’re a lesbian?
How was Fantastic Beasts? Was that your first date with [Redacted]?
Were you convinced that I gave you an STD, and subsequently disappointed upon discovering that I am totally clean?
The Subject then included a link for a Wikipedia page.

On February 15, 2017, K.L.’s ATT.com account was accessed three times and she received a forgot user ID request for each of them. K.L.’s pepperplate.com account was accessed and her password was changed. An attempt was also made to access BestBuy.com using her email address but K.L. did not have a BestBuy.com account.

On February 16, 2017, the Subject sent the victim a message from his literock@icloud.com account. The message stated:

My buddy Peter just told me he invented some app that makes someone’s iPhones go crazy. He said he beta-tested it on you. Sorry! I can’t control what other people



do (like you always say), but I swear I told him to not do it ... but then I casually went on with my day.

On February 17, 2017, K.L.'s Delta SkyMiles account was attempted to be accessed again which resulted in her log-in information being sent to her email account. On that day the Subject messaged the victim from his literock@icloud.com account stating:

Why'd you lie about the night you went to MYUMI?
I mean, the better question is why did you lie about all the things you lied about.

On February 19, 2017, access to Nintendo.com was attempted using K.L.'s email address but K.L. did not have a Nintendo.com account. K.L.'s Roku.com, Vagaro.com, civicore.com, Ann Taylor Card accounts were also accessed and she received password reset requests for them. An attempt to access K.L.'s Navient.com account was attempted resulting in her log-in information being sent to her email account. The Subject also again accessed K.L.'s FPL.com account.


On February 20, 2017, K.L.'s Chessimo.de, TripAdvisor.com, Evernote.com, Amazon.com, Uber.com, TurboTax Intuit.com and Rover.com accounts were also accessed and she received password reset requests for them. The Subject again accessed K.L.'s FPL.com account and terminated the electric service to her residence. FPL captured the same IP address the Subject used to make the prior cancellation order. On February 21, 2017 the Subject attempted to access K.L.'s Examsoft.com account resulting in her log-in information being sent to her email account. K.L.'s NCBEX.com (National Conference of Bar Examiners) account was accessed and her password was changed without her permission. K.L.'s Imodules.com account was also accessed and she received a password reset request for it.


On February 20, 2017, FPL records show that the subject again accessed K.L.'s FPL account without her permission.



On February 23, 2017, the Subject sent a message to the victim's cell phone using the literock@icloud.com. The message is as follows:

How was the [Redacted]?
How's the flight?

On February 27, 2017, K.L.'s AirBNB.com account was accessed and she received a password reset request for it. On February 28, 2017 K.L.'s Bitmoji bitstrips.com,

ASA's Initials 

Page 22 of 31


Affiant's Initials 
Judge's Initials 

LivingSocial.com, and Overstock.com accounts were accessed and she received a password reset requests for them. Later that day, K.L.'s Checkout51 and crowdstar.com accounts were again accessed by the subject without her permission. The Subject attempted to access WarbyParker.com and Nintendo.com using her email address but K.L. did not have a WarbyParker.com or a Nintendo.com account.

On March 2, 2017, the Subject sent a message to the victim from the literock@icloud.com. The message is as follows:

Bahahahahahahahahahaha!
Thanks for wasting everyone's time with your nonsense.

On March 2, 2017, at 2:03 pm, the Subject sent the victim an email from the Subject's sparkster7321@gmail.com email account. The email reads as follows:

On you.
Tell [Redacted], and all the others "FUCK YOU."

Also on March 2, 2017, the Subject accessed K.L.'s FPL.com account and changed the password without her permission. FPL again captured the same IP the Subject had been using on the prior unauthorized accesses.

On March 4, 2017, at 2:34 pm, the Subject sent the victim an email from the Subject's sparkster7321@gmail.com email account. The email reads as follows:

Bahahahahaha!

Also on March 4, 2017, the Subject logged into K.L.'s Apple account without her permission after using Apple's password recovery feature. He also accessed K.L.'s Yahoo email, Dropbox.com, Myfitnesspal.com, and Uber.com accounts were accessed and she received a password reset requests for them. K.L.'s ATT.com account was accessed and she received a forgot user ID request. K.L.'s Progressive.com auto insurance account was accessed and a payment of \$323.32 was initiated using her credit card without her permission. The Subject also accessed one of K.L.'s email accounts without her permission and sent K.L. an email from it. The subject again accessed her FPL account.

On March 5, 2017, K.L.'s ATT.com account was accessed and she received a password reset request. K.L.'s DirecTV.com account was accessed and the password was changed without her permission. On March 7, 2017, the Subject logged into K.L.'s Apple account without her

ASA's Initials




Page 23 of 31

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Affiant's Initials

Judge's Initials



permission after using Apple's password recovery feature. Also K.L.'s Facebook.com and Mapmyfitness.com accounts were accessed and she received password reset requests. K.L.'s email address and name were utilized to book a rental car from Payless Car Rental at LAX using Hotwire.com without her permission. On March 6, 2017 the Subject accessed K.L.'s FPL account.

On March 9, 2017, K.L.'s Vonage.com account was accessed and she received a password reset request.

On March 4, 2017, Victim P.T.'s PayByPhone, Twitter.com, and Gmail.com accounts were accessed and he received password reset requests for all of them. On March 5, 2017 P.T.'s Facebook account was accessed and a request was made for its deactivation as well to reset the password all without his permission. Victim P.T.'s Instagram.com, Yahoo.com, and Gmail.com accounts were accessed and he received password reset requests for all of them. Also on March 6, 2017, the Subject accessed K.L.'s FPL.com account. On March 7, 2017, Victim P.T.'s Facebook and Lyft accounts were accessed and he received password reset requests for all of them. The Subject also again accessed K.L.'s FPL account.

On March 10, 2017, at 11:27 am, the Subject sent the victim an email from the Subject's gsbino@gmail.com email account. The email reads as follows:

[Redacted],

My friend told me what he said to you. He's just a hothead and was having a bad day. You should just ignore it and stop overreacting and should let it go. [Redacted] does this stuff to everyone.

Grant

P.S. Whatever you do stay away from [Redacted]. He's genuinely afraid you're going to murder him because that's what happened to his best friend in college. I think it's somewhat ironic, because you seemed equally afraid of him. You've both completely overreacted in my opinion. But anyway, I don't doubt that he'll go to the cops if you ever contact him again. That's not a threat – I just want you to be aware of the danger.

Later on March 10, 2017, K.L. responded to the Miami-Dade State Attorney's Office and made contact with SAO Investigator Mike D'Ambrosia. K.L. described her case and dealings the Subject. K.L. also informed investigators of the fact that the Subject had appeared at several locations in Miami-Dade County where she happened to be, and that it was unlikely that these meetings were a coincidence. Law enforcement suspected that the Subject may have installed some type of tracking device on K.L.'s vehicle. Detective Rick Arias, who is a cross-sworn

ASA's Initials



Page 24 of 31

32

Affiant's Initials

Judge's Initials



investigator with the Miami Dade State Attorney's Office Public Corruption Task Force and a member of the United States Secret Service's Miami Electronic Crimes Task Force and Investigator D'Ambrosia responded to an attorney parking lot near the Miami Dade State Attorney's Office and inspected the undercarriage of K.L.'s vehicle with her permission. Upon looking under the driver's side rear bumper, Detective Arias found a hard shell case that was being held in place by magnet and glue. Upon removing the case from the bumper and opening it, Detective Arias recovered a SpyTech STI_GL300 GPS tracking device. Your Affiant has learned that SpyTech provides real time GPS location reporting for the devices it sells as a monthly service billed as "STI." K.L. was present for the inspection of her vehicle and stated that she had not provided consent to anyone to install a GPS tracking device. Your Affiant was able to determine from an instigative subpoena to Bank of America that the Subject's credit card had statement charges from "STI".

On March 13, 2017, at 9:05 am, the Subject sent the victim an email from the Subject's gсарbino@gmail.com email account. The email reads as follows:


Staying up late reading old emails from me again? Have you told [Redacted] the truth about you and your family yet?

On March 13, 2017, at 9:39 am, the Subject sent the victim an email from the Subject's gсарbino@gmail.com email account. The email reads as follows:

I can see you on your little tablet in court.

Later on Monday, March 13, 2017, your Affiant met with K.L. who provided a list of all of her accounts that the Subject succeeded in compromising which included:

Verizon
Navient
USAA
Apple iCloud
School email
Google email
Yahoo email
AOL Instant Messenger
AirBNB
Facebook
Pepperplate.com
FPL
Hulu.com
Birchbox.com



Roku.com
Snapchat
OkCupid
OpenTable.com
Resy.com
Meetup.com
NCBE
Progressive Insurance
Instagram
Vonage
Dropbox
CVS Caremark

K.L. provided your affiant with a list of accounts that the subject had attempted to compromise, but that to her knowledge he was unable to successfully take over:

Bitmoji
Rover.com
ZyngaWithFriends
Delta Skymiles
Department of Education FSA ID
Protection 1
TurboTax
WellsFargo.com
CapitalOne.com
Blue Apron
USAjobs.gov
Governmentjobs.com
Civicore.com
AT&T
LinkedIn
Pandora
kayak.com
Google email
School email

On March 23, 2017, your affiant learned from K.L. that she received an email appearing to be from P.T.'s email address stating "Hey, I lost my phone. I have something I want to talk to you about. Give me a call on my landline: (786) 353-4791." K.L. contacted P.T. on his cellular phone and confirmed that P.T. did not send this email and that P.T.'s email address was spoofed. Your Affiant was able to determine that the phone number listed in the email was a Voice over Internet Protocol (VOIP) and was assigned to Google.

ASA's Initials SA

Page 26 of 31
32

Affiant's Initials SA
Judge's Initials SA

On March 30, 2017, the Subject logged on to K.L.'s Groupon.com account without her permission and purchased two vouchers for a total of \$54.00 using her American Express card also without her permission. Groupon captured the IP address that the Subject was using which matched the IP address used by the Subject for a recent purchase from SpoofCard.


Your affiant reached out to the true owners of the phone numbers that the Subject impersonated in calling K.L. For each of the following individuals, the Subject used the SpoofCard service to make it appear as if that person was calling K.L. The person's phone number would appear on her Caller ID along with their name.



Your Affiant contacted Mr. David Assouline, who is an acquaintance of K.L. Mr. Assouline stated that he received text messages and phone calls from an unknown caller who made inquiries about his relationship with K.L. Mr. Assouline was informed of several calls that were made to K.L with the Spoofcard service utilizing his phone number. Mr. Assouline confirmed that these calls were made without his permission or knowledge and that he did not authorize anyone to use his personal identification including his name and phone number. These calls and texts ranged from 07/16/2016 through 01/14/2017.

Your Affiant contacted Ms. Ashley Petrey, who is an acquaintance of K.L. Ms. Petrey stated that she had been receiving phone calls from who she believed to be K.L. based upon the caller identification that was displayed on her phone. Ms. Petrey missed the calls, but upon calling K.L back, K.L informed her that she did not call her. Ms. Petrey was informed of several calls that were made to K.L with the Spoofcard service utilizing her phone number. Ms. Petrey confirmed that these calls were made without her permission or knowledge and that she did not authorize anyone to use her personal identification including her name and phone numbers. These calls and texts ranged from 10/6/2016 through 02/11/2017.

Your Affiant contacted Ms. Arisse Fernandez, who is an acquaintance of K.L. Ms. Fernandez stated that she knew that K.L was experiencing an issue with someone making phone calls and utilizing other individual's caller identification. Ms. Fernandez was informed of several calls that were made to K.L with the Spoofcard service utilizing her phone number. Ms. Fernandez confirmed that these calls were made without her permission or knowledge and she did not authorize anyone to use her personal identification including her name and phone number. These calls all occurred on 02/05/2017.

ASA's Initials 

Page 27 of 31 

Affiant's Initials 
Judge's Initials 

Your Affiant contacted Ms. Bethany Rentz, who is an acquaintance of K.L. Ms. Rentz was informed of several calls that were made to K.L with the Spoofcard service. Ms. Rentz confirmed that these calls were made without her permission or knowledge and she did not authorize anyone to use her personal identification including her name and phone number. These calls and texts ranged from 01/14/2017 through 02/10/2017.

Your Affiant contacted Ms. Emily Cardamone, who is an acquaintance of K.L. Ms. Cardamone stated that she knew that K.L was experiencing an issue with someone making phone calls and utilizing other individual's caller identification. Ms. Cardamone was informed of several calls that were made to K.L with the Spoofcard service. Ms. Cardamone confirmed that these calls were made without her permission or knowledge and she did not authorize anyone to use her personal identification including her name and phone number. These calls and texts ranged from 01/15/2017 through 02/25/2017.

Your Affiant contacted Mr. Charles Carr Taylor, who is an acquaintance of K.L. Mr. Taylor was informed of several calls that were made to K.L with the Spoofcard service. Mr. Taylor confirmed that these calls were made without his permission or knowledge and he did not authorize anyone to use his personal identification including his name and phone number. These calls and texts ranged from 02/07/2017 through 02/11/2017.

Your Affiant contacted Mr. Chris Westrom, who is an acquaintance of K.L. Mr. Westrom stated that she knew that K.L was experiencing an issue with someone making phone calls and utilizing other individual's caller identification. Mr. Westrom was informed of several calls that were made to K.L with the Spoofcard service. Mr. Westrom confirmed that these calls were made without his permission or knowledge and he did not authorize anyone to use his personal identification including his name and phone number. These calls and texts ranged from 01/14/2017 through 02/02/2017.

Your Affiant contacted Ms. Christina Jenkins, who is an acquaintance of K.L. Ms. Jenkins stated that she knew that K.L was experiencing an issue with someone making phone calls and utilizing other individual's caller identification. Ms. Jenkins was informed of a call that was made to K.L with the Spoofcard service. Ms. Jenkins confirmed that this call was made without her permission or knowledge and she did not authorize anyone to use her personal identification including her name and phone number. This call occurred on 02/11/2017


ASA's Initials



Page 28 of 31

Affiant's Initials

Judge's Initials




Your Affiant contacted Mr. Daren Goldin, who is an acquaintance of K.L. Mr. Goldin stated that he knew that K.L was experiencing an issue with someone making phone calls and utilizing other individual's caller identification. Mr. Goldin was informed of a call that was made to K.L with the Spoofcard service. Mr. Goldin confirmed that this call was made without his permission or knowledge and he did not authorize anyone to use his personal identification to including his name and phone number. This call occurred on 01/15/2017

Your Affiant contacted Ms. Holly Hobbs, who is an acquaintance of K.L. Ms. Hobbs stated that she knew that K.L was experiencing an issue with someone making phone calls and utilizing other individual's caller identification. Ms. Hobbs was informed of a several calls that were made to K.L with the Spoofcard service. Ms. Hobbs confirmed that these calls were made without her permission or knowledge and she did not authorize anyone to use her personal identification including her name and phone number. These calls and texts ranged from 01/15/2017 through 02/02/2017.

Your Affiant contacted Ms. Kayvonne Lyons, who is an acquaintance of K.L. Ms. Lyons stated that she knew that K.L was experiencing an issue with someone making phone calls and utilizing other individual's caller identification. Ms. Lyons was informed of a call that was made to K.L with the Spoofcard service. Ms. Lyons confirmed that this call was made without her permission or knowledge and she did not authorize anyone to use her personal identification including her name and phone number. This call was made on 01/22/2017.

Your Affiant contacted Ms. Sara Reyerson who is an acquaintance of K.L. Ms. Reyerson stated that she knew that K.L was experiencing an issue with someone making phone calls and utilizing other individual's caller identification. Ms. Reyerson was informed of a call that was made to K.L with the Spoofcard service. Ms. Reyerson confirmed that this call was made without her permission or knowledge and she did not authorize anyone to use her personal identification including her name and phone number. This call was made on 02/10/2017.

Your Affiant contacted J.L. who is a family member of K.L. J.L. stated that she knew that K.L was experiencing an issue with someone making phone calls and utilizing other individual's caller identification. J.L. was informed of a several calls that were made to K.L with the Spoofcard service. J.L. confirmed that these calls were made without her permission or knowledge and she did not authorize anyone to use her personal identification including her



name and phone number. These calls ranged from 01/18/2017 to 02/6/2017. J.L. stated that these spoofed calls are still ongoing.



Your Affiant contacted D.L. who is a family member of K.L. D.L. stated that he knew that K.L. was experiencing an issue with someone making phone calls and utilizing other individual's caller identification. D.L. was informed of several calls that were made to K.L. with the Spoofcard service. D.L. confirmed that these calls were made without his permission or knowledge and he did not authorize anyone to use his personal identification including his name and phone number. These calls were made from 02/09/2017 to 03/13/2017.

Your Affiant contacted Mr. Jonathan Cruz, who is an acquaintance of K.L. Mr. Cruz stated that he received phone calls from an unknown caller who made inquiries about his relationship with K.L. Mr. Cruz stated that he had received several calls appearing to be from K.L. and when he answered the phone there was no voice on the other end of the line. When Mr. Cruz called K.L. back, he was informed that K.L. never called him. Mr. Cruz was informed of several calls that were made to K.L. with the Spoofcard service. Mr. Cruz confirmed that these calls were made without his permission or knowledge and he did not authorize anyone to use his personal identification including his name and phone number. All of these calls occurred on 02/09/2017.

Your Affiant contacted Ms. Miri Song, who is an acquaintance of K.L. Ms. Song was informed of several calls that were made to K.L. with the Spoofcard service. Ms. Song confirmed that these calls were made without her permission or knowledge and she did not authorize anyone to use her personal identification including her name and phone number. These calls ranged from 02/05/2017 through 02/25/2017.

Your Affiant contacted Mr. Phil Defabio, who is an acquaintance of K.L. Mr. Defabio stated that he received text messages and phone calls from an unknown caller who he believed to be K.L. due to the phone number that was being displayed on his phone. Mr. Defabio was informed of several calls that were made to K.L. with the Spoofcard service. Mr. Defabio confirmed that these calls were made without his permission or knowledge and he did not authorize anyone to use his personal identification including his name and phone number. These calls and texts ranged from 01/07/2017 through 3/13/2017.

Your Affiant contacted Roy Ugarte, who is an acquaintance of K.L. Mr. Ugarte stated that he had received several calls from K.L. and when he answered the phone there was no voice

on the other end of the line. When Mr. Ugarte called K.L back he was informed that K.L. never called him. Mr. Ugarte was informed of several calls that were made to K.L with the Spoofcard service. Mr. Ugarte confirmed that these calls were made without his permission or knowledge and he did not authorize anyone to use his personal identification including his name and phone number. These calls ranged from 02/5/2017 through 03/04/2017.

Your Affiant contacted Mr. Pat Nally, who is an acquaintance of K.L. Mr. Nally stated that he knew that K.L was experiencing an issue with someone making phone calls and utilizing other individual's caller identification. Mr. Nally was informed of several calls that were made to K.L with the Spoofcard service. Mr. Nally confirmed that these calls were made without his permission or knowledge and he did not authorize anyone to use his personal identification including his name and phone number. These calls were made on 02/10/2017 and 02/25/2017.

Your Affiant contacted Mr. John L., who is a family member of K.L. Mr. L. stated that he knew that K.L was experiencing an issue with someone making phone calls and utilizing other individual's caller identification. Mr. L. was informed of several calls that were made to K.L with the Spoofcard service. Mr. L. confirmed that these calls were made without his permission or knowledge and he did not authorize anyone to use his personal identification including his name and phone numbers. These calls ranged from 1/15/2017 to 3/12/2017.

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
Page 31 of 31



Affiant's Initials



Judge's Initials




WHEREFORE, for the foregoing reasons, "Your Affiant" requests a warrant for the arrest of Grant Sarbinoff for one count of Identity Fraud more than 20 Victims, seventeen counts of Unauthorized Access to a protected computer system, one count of Unlawful Use of a Two-Way Communications Device, one count of Stalking, one count of Harassing Telephone Calls, and one count of Unlawful Use of a GPS Tracking Device, based on the probable cause herein shown.



Detective Steve Kaufman

AFFIANT

SWORN TO AND SUBSCRIBED before me this 1 day of May, 2017.



JUDGE OF THE CIRCUIT COURT
OF THE ELEVENTH JUDICIAL
CIRCUIT OF FLORIDA

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Judge's Initials SK